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Abstract In this paper minimum coloring games are considered. We characterize the
class of conflict graphs inducing simple or three-valued simple minimum coloring
games. We provide an upper bound on the number of maximum cliques of conflict
graphs inducing such games. Moreover, a characterization of the core is provided in
terms of the underlying conflict graph. In particular, in case of a perfect conflict graph
the core of an induced three-valued simple minimum coloring game equals the vital
core.
Keywords Minimum coloring games · Simple games · Three-valued simple games
JEL Classification C71 · C44
1 Introduction
Consider a set of agents who all need access to some type of facility, but some agents
might be in conflict. All facilities are similar, but if two agents are in conflict, they
cannot have access to the same facility. The total costs are linearly increasing with
the number of facilities used, so the aim is to find the minimum number of facilities
that can serve all agents. This problem can be modelled by an undirected graph,
called the conflict graph, in which the vertices represent the agents. Two vertices
are adjacent if and only if the corresponding agents are in conflict. Next, we color all
vertices in such a way that any two adjacent nodes receive different colors. Finding the
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minimum number of facilities such that every agent has non-conflicting access to some
facility, is equivalent to finding a coloring of this conflict graph that uses the smallest
number of colors. This combinatorial optimization problem is known as the minimum
coloring problem.A survey onminimumcoloring problems can, for example, be found
in Randerath and Schiermeyer (2004) and Pardalos et al. (1999). An application of the
minimum coloring problem is, for example, scheduling courses at secondary schools,
where some courses are compulsory and other courses are electives. Courses can be
scheduled in any order, but pairs of courses are in conflict in the sense that they can
not be assigned to the same time slot if there is a student who has chosen both courses.
Assuming that in the initial situation no agents share facilities, optimal cooperation
in sharing facilities between non-conflicting agents will lead to minimal joint costs.
To analyze how to divide the minimal joint costs among the agents, Deng et al. (1999)
introduced minimum coloring games. A minimum coloring cost game can be seen
as an example of a combinatorial optimization or operations research game. In a
combinatorial optimization game, the value of each coalition is obtained by solving a
combinatorial optimization problem on the corresponding substructure. A survey on
operations research games can be found in Borm et al. (2001).
In Deng et al. (1999) the existence of core elements is investigated for the more
general class of combinatorial optimization cost gameswhere the value of a coalition is
defined by an integer program. They showed that such games have a non-empty core if
and only if the associated linear program has an integer optimal solution. Moreover, in
case of bipartite conflict graphs, they characterized the core of the induced minimum
coloring games as the convex hull of the characteristic vectors of the edges in the
conflict graph. Deng et al. (2000) studied total balancedness of minimum coloring
games and other combinatorial optimization games. They showed that a minimum
coloring game is totally balanced if and only if the underlying conflict graph is perfect.
In Okamoto (2003) concave minimum coloring games are characterized in terms of
forbidden subgraphs. Moreover, for this case an explicit formula of the Shapley value
is provided. In Bietenhader and Okamoto (2006) core largeness, extendability, and
exactness of minimum coloring games are considered. Okamoto (2008) characterized
the core of minimum coloring games on perfect conflict graphs as the convex hull of
the characteristic vectors of the maximum cliques in the conflict graph, which is a
generalization of the result by Deng et al. (1999). Additionally, Okamoto (2008) also
investigated the nucleolus, the compromise value and the Shapley value of a minimum
coloring game. The most recent work on minimum coloring games is by Hamers et al.
(2014). Theyprovided a necessary and sufficient condition for a conflict graph such that
the induced minimum coloring game has a population monotonic allocation scheme.
The minimum coloring games studied in the works above are cost games. However,
if we assume that in the initial situation no agents share facilities, i.e., every vertex has
its own color, then cooperation in sharing facilities between non-conflicting agentswill
lead to cost savings. In this paper we define minimum coloring games as cost savings
games instead of cost games and we focus on conflict graphs inducing coalitional cost
savings in {0, 1} or {0, 1, 2}. Games for which the only possible values for a coalition
are 0 and 1 are called simple. Simple games are introduced by von Neumann and
Morgenstern (1944) and further studied by Shapley and Shubik (1954). Games for
which the only possible values for a coalition are 0, 1 and 2 are called three-valued
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simple. The class of three-valued simple games is a natural extension of the class of
simple games. Three-valued simple games are introduced and studied by Musegaas
et al. (2015).Both classes of games allow for amore explicit description of the core than
general games (using the concepts of veto and vital players). Also a characterization of
the Shapley value is available for these two classes of games using the transfer property.
This can lead to a better understanding of how to solve, in a fair and stable way, the
joint allocation problem arising from a minimum coloring problem that corresponds
to a simple or three-valued simple game.
In this paper we investigate two features of simple and three-valued simple mini-
mum coloring games. First, we characterize the class of conflict graphs inducing such
games. For this characterization, a distinction is made between perfect and imperfect
conflict graphs, and the concept of maximum clique is used. We show that simple
minimum coloring games are always induced by perfect graphs, while three-valued
simple minimum coloring games can be induced by both perfect and imperfect graphs.
In particular, there is only one class of imperfect conflict graphs inducing three-valued
simple minimum coloring games. We also provide an upper bound on the number of
maximum cliques for conflict graphs inducing simple or three-valued simple games.
Second, we characterize the core in terms of the underlying conflict graph for these
games. This characterization is also based on the concept of maximum clique. Since
simple minimum coloring games are always induced by perfect graphs, the character-
ization of the core is readily derived. We show that for three-valued simple minimum
coloring games induced by imperfect conflict graphs, the core is empty. On the other
hand, for three-valued simple minimum coloring games induced by perfect conflict
graphs, we show that the core equals the vital core, as introduced by Musegaas et al.
(2015). This strengthens the general relation between the vital core and the core for
three-valued simple minimum coloring games.
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 recalls basic definitions from
graph theory and formally introducesminimum coloring games. In Sect. 3 simplemin-
imum coloring games are investigated. Finally, Sect. 4 analyzes three-valued simple
minimum coloring games.
2 Minimum coloring games
In this section we recall basic definitions from graph theory and formally define min-
imum coloring games. We also provide a survey of game-theoretic characteristics of
minimum coloring games and in particular recall the characterization of the core of
minimum coloring games associated to perfect conflict graphs.
Let G = (N , E) be an undirected graph G, represented by a pair (N , E), where
N = {1, . . . , n} is a set of vertices and E ⊆ {{i, j} | i, j ∈ N , i = j} is a set
of edges. The graph G is called complete if E = {{i, j} | i, j ∈ N , i = j}, that
is every two vertices are adjacent. Kn denotes the complete graph on n vertices.
For S ⊆ N , the subgraph of G induced by S is the graph G[S] = (S, ES) where
ES = {{i, j} ∈ E | i, j ∈ S}. The complement of G is the graph G = (N , E) where
E = {{i, j} | i, j ∈ N , i = j, {i, j} /∈ E}. In this paper we only consider graphs that
are connected on N , i.e., every pair of vertices is linked via a sequence of consecutive
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edges in E . However, note that it still might happen that some induced subgraph G[S]
is not connected on S via ES . For conflict graphs, {i, j} ∈ E is interpreted as i and j
being in conflict.
A coloring of G is a mapping γ : N → N such that γ (i) = γ ( j) for every
{i, j} ∈ E . The natural numbers assigned to the vertices correspond to the colors
assigned to the vertices. A minimum coloring of G is a coloring γ that uses the
smallest number of colors, i.e., a coloring for which |{γ (i) | i ∈ N }| is minimal. The
number of colors in a minimum coloring is called the chromatic number of G and
is denoted by χ(G). The problem of finding a minimum coloring of a conflict graph
(N , E) is called a minimum coloring problem.
The chromatic number of a conflict graph is strongly related to the concept of a
clique, where a clique in G is a set S ⊆ N such that G[S] = K|S|. A maximum clique
of G is a clique S of the largest possible size, i.e., a clique for which |S| is maximal.
The number of vertices in a maximum clique is called the clique number of G and is
denoted by ω(G). We denote the set of all maximum cliques in G by (G), i.e.,
(G) = {S ⊆ N | G[S] = Kω(G)
}
.
Note that all vertices in a maximum clique are mutually adjacent and therefore each
of them has to receive a different color in a minimum coloring, so
χ(G) ≥ ω(G), (1)
for any conflict graph G.
With N a non-empty finite set of players, a transferable utility (TU) game is a
function v : 2N → R which assigns a number to each coalition S ∈ 2N , where
2N denotes the collection of all subsets of N . The value v(S) denotes the highest
joint monetary payoff or cost savings the coalition S can jointly generate by means of
optimal cooperation without any help of the players in N\S. By convention, v(∅) = 0.
Let TUN denote the class of all TU-games with player set N .
If we assume that initially every vertex has its own color, then theminimumcoloring
of G results in optimal cost savings for N as a whole. To tackle the allocation problem
of these cost savings one can analyze an associated TU-game vG to a minimum
coloring problem with conflict graph G = (N , E), where the set of players is the
set of vertices. For a coalition S ⊆ N , v(S) reflects the maximal cost savings this
coalition can generate, i.e., the number of colors that are saved with respect to the
initial situation where |S| colors were used. Hence, the value of coalition S is obtained
by solving the minimum coloring problemwith conflict graphG[S]. Correspondingly,
the minimum coloring game vG ∈ TUN induced by the conflict graph G = (N , E) is
defined by
vG(S) = |S| − χ(G[S]),
for all S ⊆ N .
In the following, we give an example of a minimum coloring game and discuss the
concepts of clique number and chromatic number.
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Fig. 1 The conflict graph of example 2.1
Example 2.1 Consider the conflict graph G = (N , E) with N = {1, . . . , 5} as
depicted in Fig. 1. Note that (G) = {{1, 3, 5}, {1, 4, 5}, {2, 4, 5}}, so using (1) we
have χ(G) ≥ ω(G) = 3. Consider the following coloring ofG with three colors given
by the function γ : N → {1, 2, 3} with
γ (1) = γ (2) = 1,
γ (3) = γ (4) = 2,
γ (5) = 3.
We may conclude that this coloring γ is a minimum coloring of G and χ(G) = 3. As
a consequence, the value of the grand coalition N is given by
vG(N ) = 5 − χ(G) = 2.
For coalition {1, 2}, the induced subgraph G[{1, 2}] contains no edges and thus
only one color is needed to color the vertices, i.e., χ(G[{1, 2}]) = 1. Hence, the value
of coalition {1, 2} is given by
vG({1, 2}) = 2 − χ(G[{1, 2}]) = 1.





2 if {1, 2, 3, 4} ⊆ S,
1 if {1, 2} ⊆ S or {2, 3} ⊆ S or {3, 4} ⊆ S, and {1, 2, 3, 4}  S,
0 otherwise,
for all S ⊆ N . 
A game v ∈ TUN is called monotonic if
v(S) ≤ v(T ),
for all S, T ∈ 2N with S ⊆ T . Minimum coloring games are integer valued nonnega-
tive monotonic games as is seen in the following proposition.
123
244 M. Musegaas et al.
Proposition 2.1 Let G = (N , E) be a graph. Then, vG is integer valued, nonnegative
and monotonic.
Proof Integer valuedness and nonnegativity of vG are straightforward consequences
of the definition. As for monotonicity, let S, T ∈ 2N with S ⊆ T . Note that if a
minimum coloring forG[S] uses χ(G[S]) colors, then at most |T \S| additional colors
are necessary for a minimum coloring of G[T ], i.e., χ(G[T ]) ≤ χ(G[S]) + |T \S|.
As a consequence,
vG(S) = |S| − χ(G[S]) ≤ |S| − χ(G[T ]) + |T \S| = |T | − χ(G[T ]) = vG(T ).
	unionsq
The core C(v) of a game v ∈ TUN is defined as the set of all allocations x ∈ RN
such that
∑
i∈N xi = v(N ) (efficiency) and
∑
i∈S xi ≥ v(S) for all S ⊆ N (stability).
Hence, the core consists of all possible allocations of v(N ) for which no coalition has
an incentive to leave the grand coalition. Consequently, if the core is empty, then it is
not possible to find a stable allocation of v(N ).
Okamoto (2008) characterized the core of minimum coloring games induced by
perfect conflict graphs, where a graph G = (N , E) is called perfect if
ω(G[S]) = χ(G[S]),
for all S ⊆ N . If a graph is not perfect, then it is called imperfect. In the characterization
of the core provided below the notation of a characteristic vector is used. For S ∈
2N\{∅}, the characteristic vector eS ∈ RN is defined as
eSi =
{
1 if i ∈ S,
0 otherwise,
for all i ∈ N .
Theorem 2.2 [cf. Okamoto (2008)] Let G = (N , E) be a perfect graph. Then,
C(vG) = Conv
({
eN\S | S ∈ (G)
})
.
Chudnovsky et al. (2006) characterized perfect graphs. This characterization uses
the notion of cycle graphs, where a cycle graph Cn is a graph G = (N , E) for which
there exists a bijection f : {1, . . . , n} → N such that
E = {{ f (i), f (i + 1)} | i ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}} ∪ { f (1), f (n)} .
An odd cycle graph is a cycle graph Cn where n is odd.
Theorem 2.3 [cf. Chudnovsky et al. (2006)] A graph is perfect if and only if it does
not contain an odd cycle graph of length at least five, or a complement of such graph,
as an induced subgraph.
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Example 2.2 Reconsider the conflict graph G = (N , E) in Fig. 1. Since G does not
contain an odd cycle graph of length at least five, or a complement of such graph as
an induced subgraph, we know from Theorem 2.3 that G is a perfect conflict graph.
Since the set (G) of maximum cliques is given by
(G) = {{1, 3, 5}, {1, 4, 5}, {2, 4, 5}} ,
it follows from Theorem 2.2 that
C(vG) = Conv({(0, 1, 0, 1, 0), (0, 1, 1, 0, 0), (1, 0, 1, 0, 0)}).

3 Simple minimum coloring games
In this section we consider simple minimum coloring games. First, we characterize the
class of conflict graphs inducing minimum coloring games that are simple. After that,
we consider in more detail these conflict graphs and analyze the core of the induced
minimum coloring games.
Recall that a game v ∈ TUN is called simple if
(i) v(S) ∈ {0, 1} for all S ⊂ N ,
(ii) v(N ) = 1,
(iii) v is monotonic.
Let SIN denote the class of all simple games with player set N . The following theorem
gives a necessary and sufficient condition, in terms of the chromatic number, for a
conflict graph to induce a simple minimum coloring game.
Theorem 3.1 Let G = (N , E) be a graph. Then, vG ∈ SIN if and only if χ(G) =
n − 1.
Proof (“⇒”) Let vG ∈ SIN . Then, vG(N ) = 1 and consequently χ(G) = n −
vG(N ) = n − 1.
(“⇐”) Letχ(G) = n−1. Then, vG(N ) = n−χ(G) = 1.According to Proposition 2.1
vG is integer valued, nonnegative and monotonic, so in particular vG(S) ∈ {0, 1} for
all S ⊂ N , which implies vG ∈ SIN . 	unionsq
Proposition 3.3 provides an upper bound on the number of maximum cliques for
conflict graphs inducing simple games. This proposition also states that conflict graphs
inducing simple games are perfect. In the proof of this propositionwe use the following
lemma, which gives the clique number and the chromatic number for odd cycle graphs
of length at least five and their complements. The proof of this lemma is straightforward
and therefore omitted.
Lemma 3.2 Let k ∈ Nwith k ≥ 2. Then,ω(C2k+1) = 2, χ(C2k+1) = 3,ω(C2k+1) =
k and χ(C2k+1) = k + 1.
Proposition 3.3 Let G = (N , E) be a graph. If vG ∈ SIN , then
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(i) G is perfect,
(ii) |(G)| ≤ 2.
Proof Let vG ∈ SIN . Then, according to Theorem 3.1, χ(G) = n − 1.
Part (i): Suppose that G is not perfect. Then, according to Theorem 2.3, there exists
an S ⊆ N such that G[S] = C2k+1 or G[S] = C¯2k+1 with k ≥ 2. Then, using
Lemma 3.2, we have
vG(S) = |S| − χ(G[S]) = 2k + 1 − 3 = 2k − 2 ≥ 2 > vG(N )
in case G[S] = C2k+1, or
vG(S) = |S| − χ(G[S]) = 2k + 1 − (k + 1) = k ≥ 2 > vG(N ),
in caseG[S] = C¯2k+1, which both contradict monotonicity of vG . Hence,G is perfect.
Part (ii): Since G is perfect (see part (i)) and vG is simple, we have ω(G) = χ(G) =
n − 1. Suppose |(G)| > 2 and let k, l and m be three distinct vertices such that
N\{k}, N\{l} and N\{m} are maximum cliques of G. Since G[N\{k}] = Kn−1 and
G[N\{l}] = Kn−1, we have
{{i, j}|i, j ∈ N , i = j}\{k, l} ⊆ E .
Moreover, since G[N\{m}] = Kn−1 and {k, l} ⊆ N\{m} we have {k, l} ∈ E . This
implies G = Kn which contradicts χ(G) = n − 1. Hence, |(G)| ≤ 2. 	unionsq
Note that the conditions in Proposition 3.3 are only sufficient conditions and not
necessary conditions. Consider for example the conflict graph in Fig. 4 in Sect. 4.1.
This conflict graph is perfect and has two maximum cliques. However, this conflict
graph does not induce a simple game because the value of the grand coalition in the
induced minimum coloring game is 2.
Due to the fact that conflict graphs are assumed to be connected on N , we may con-
clude from Theorem 3.1 that a conflict graph inducing a simple game has at least three
vertices. Moreover, from the previous proposition in combination with Theorem 3.1
we may conclude that a conflict graph G = (N , E) inducing a simple game has at
least one and at most two maximum cliques of size n − 1. So, there are two classes
of conflict graphs on n vertices inducing a simple game. The first class consists of the
conflict graphs with one maximum clique of size n − 1. Note that this class consists
of n − 3 different conflict graphs (up to isomorphism)1, because the vertex that is
not in the maximum clique is adjacent to at least one vertex (because G is assumed
to be connected on N ) and at most n − 3 vertices (because otherwise there are two
maximum cliques). For an illustration with six vertices, see Fig. 2a, b, c. The second
class consists of the conflict graphs with two maximum cliques of size n−1. Note that
1 Two graphs G = (N , E) and G′ = (N ′, E ′) are called isomorphic if there exists a bijection f : N → N ′
such that {u, v} ∈ E if and only if { f (u), f (v)} ∈ E ′.
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Fig. 2 All conflict graphs (up to isomorphism) on six vertices inducing a simple game
this class consists of a unique conflict graph (up to isomorphism), namely the conflict
graph with exactly one pair of vertices not being adjacent. For an illustration with six
vertices, see Fig. 2d. Hence, for given n ≥ 3, there are n − 2 different conflict graphs
(up to isomorphism) on n vertices inducing a simple game.
Using Theorem 2.2 and Proposition 3.3, one derives the following description of
the core for simple minimum coloring games.
Corollary 3.4 Let G = (N , E) be a graph and let vG ∈ SIN .
(i) If (G) = {N\{i}}, then
C(vG) = e{i}.






Example 3.1 Consider the conflict graphG = (N , E) in Fig. 2a, b or c. Since(G) =
{{2, 3, 4, 5, 6}} and vG ∈ SIN , it follows from Corollary 3.4 that
C(vG) = {(1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)} .
Next, consider the conflict graph G = (N , E) in Fig. 2d. Since
(G) = {{2, 3, 4, 5, 6}, {1, 3, 4, 5, 6}} ,
and vG ∈ SIN , it follows from Corollary 3.4 that
C(vG) = Conv ({(1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0)}) .

4 Three-valued simple minimum coloring games
In this sectionwe characterize the class of conflict graphs inducing three-valued simple
minimumcoloring games. For this, a distinction ismade between perfect and imperfect
conflict graphs. After that, we characterize the core in terms of the underlying conflict
graph for these games.
Musegaas et al. (2015) defined a game v ∈ TUN to be three-valued simple if
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(i) v(S) ∈ {0, 1, 2} for all S ⊂ N ,
(ii) v(N ) = 2,
(iii) v is monotonic.
Let TSIN denote the class of all three-valued simple games with player set N . The
following theorem gives a necessary and sufficient condition, in terms of the chromatic
number, for a conflict graph to induce a three-valued simple game.
Theorem 4.1 Let G = (N , E) be a graph. Then, vG ∈ TSIN if and only if χ(G) =
n − 2.2
Proof (“⇒”) Let vG ∈ TSIN . Then, vG(N ) = 2 and consequently χ(G) = n −
vG(N ) = n − 2.
(“⇐”) Letχ(G) = n−2. Then, vG(N ) = n−χ(G) = 2.According to Proposition 2.1
vG is integer valued, nonnegative and monotonic, so in particular vG(S) ∈ {0, 1, 2}
for all S ⊂ N , which implies vG ∈ TSIN . 	unionsq
From now on, we distinguish between two classes of conflict graphs inducing
three-valued simple minimum coloring games: perfect conflict graphs (Sect. 4.1) and
imperfect conflict graphs (Sect. 4.2). For both classes, we consider in more detail
the structure of these conflict graphs and the cores of the induced minimum coloring
games.
4.1 Three-valued simple minimum coloring games induced by perfect conflict
graphs
In this section we consider three-valued simple minimum coloring games induced by
perfect conflict graphs. We show that for these games the core equals the vital core,
introduced by Musegaas et al. (2015).
We start with providing an upper bound on the number of maximum cliques for
perfect conflict graphs inducing three-valued simple games.
Proposition 4.2 Let G = (N , E) be a perfect graph. If vG ∈ TSIN , then |(G)| ≤ 4.
Proof Let vG ∈ TSIN . Then, using Theorem 4.1, χ(G) = n − 2. Hence, due to the
fact that G is assumed to be connected on N , we have n ≥ 4. Moreover, since G is
perfect, we have ω(G) = χ(G) = n − 2, so at least two pairs of vertices are not
adjacent in G. Without loss of generality we can assume that either {1, 2} /∈ E and
{3, 4} /∈ E , or {1, 2} /∈ E and {2, 3} /∈ E . Therefore, we distinguish between the
following two cases:
(a) Assume {1, 2} /∈ E and {3, 4} /∈ E . Then the sets of vertices that can possibly
form a maximum clique are
{T ⊆ N | |T | = n − 2, {1, 2}  T, {3, 4}  T }.
2 Note that Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 4.1 can be generalized for a more general class of integer valued,
nonnegative and monotonic games.
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Therefore, a maximum clique is of the form
N\{i, j},
with i ∈ {1, 2} and j ∈ {3, 4}. Hence, there are only four sets of vertices that can
possibly form a maximum clique, i.e., |(G)| ≤ 4.
(b) Assume {1, 2} /∈ E and {2, 3} /∈ E . Since N\{2} cannot form a clique, we know
that there exists a pair of vertices {i, j} ⊆ N\{2} with i = j and {i, j} /∈ E .
Hence, without loss of generality we can assume that {1, 3} /∈ E , {3, 4} /∈ E or
{4, 5} /∈ E (the last case is only possible if n ≥ 5).
If {3, 4} /∈ E , then we are back to case (a) and thus |(G)| ≤ 4.
On the other hand, if {4, 5} /∈ E , then the sets of vertices that can possibly form
a maximum clique are
{T ⊆ N | |T | = n − 2, {1, 2}  T, {2, 3}  T, {4, 5}  T }.
Therefore, a maximum clique is of the form
N\{2, j},
with j ∈ {4, 5}. Hence, there are only two sets of vertices that can possibly form
a maximum clique, i.e., |(G)| ≤ 2.
Finally, if {1, 3} /∈ E , then the sets of vertices that can possibly form a maximum
clique are
{T ⊆ N | |T | = n − 2, {1, 2}  T, {1, 3}  T, {2, 3}  T }.
Therefore, a maximum clique is of the form
N\{i, j},
with i = j and {i, j} ⊆ {1, 2, 3}. Hence, there are only three sets of vertices that
can possibly form a maximum clique, i.e., |(G)| ≤ 3.
As one can see, in both cases |(G)| ≤ 4. 	unionsq
Note that the condition in Proposition 4.2 is only a sufficient condition and not
a necessary condition. Consider for example the conflict graphs in Fig. 2 in Sect. 3,
which all are perfect and all have at most two maximum cliques. However, none of
the conflict graphs induces a three-valued simple game because the value of the grand
coalition in every induced minimum coloring game is 1.
Due to the fact that conflict graphs are assumed to be connected on N , we may
conclude from Theorem 4.1 that a conflict graph inducing a three-valued simple game
has at least four vertices. Moreover, from the previous proposition we may also con-
clude that a perfect conflict graph G = (N , E) inducing a three-valued simple game
has at most four maximum cliques of size n − 2. Figure 3 depicts all perfect conflict
graphs (up to isomorphism) on four vertices inducing a three-valued simple game. All
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Fig. 3 All perfect conflict graphs (up to isomorphism) on four vertices inducing a three-valued simple
game
conflict graphs have a clique number of two. The conflict graph in Fig. 3a has four
maximum cliques and the conflict graphs in Fig. 3b, c have three maximum cliques.
Musegaas et al. (2015) analyzed the core of three-valued simple games. In particular,
by introducing the concepts of vital players, primary vital players and secondary vital
pairs, they defined the vital core for the class of permissible three-valued simple games.
The vital core was shown to be a subset of the core for every permissible three-valued
simple game. We summarize the relevant notions and results from Musegaas et al.
(2015), and show that for the class of three-valued simple games induced by perfect
conflict graphs, the core and the vital core coincide.
For v ∈ TSIN , the set of vital players is defined by
Vit(v) =
⋂
{S ⊆ N | v(S) = 2} .
Hence, the vital players are those players who belong to every coalition with value 2.
Using the concept of vital players, the following lemma provides a sufficient condition
for emptiness of the core of a three-valued simple game.
Lemma 4.3 [cf.Musegaas et al. (2015)]Letv ∈ TSIN . If Vit(v) = ∅orv(N\Vit(v)) >
0, then C(v) = ∅.
From the previous lemma it follows that only the set of permissible three-valued
simple games may have a non-empty core, where a game v ∈ TSIN is called permis-
sible if the following two conditions are satisfied:
(i) Vit(v) = ∅,
(ii) v(N\Vit(v)) = 0.
For our further analysis of the core we can restrict attention to permissible three-valued
simple games.
For a permissible game v ∈ TSIN , the reduced game vr ∈ TSIVit(v) is defined by
vr (S) = v(S ∪ (N\Vit(v))),
for all S ⊆ Vit(v). Note that a reduced game is also a three-valued simple game
and allows for only one coalition with value 2, namely the grand coalition Vit(v).
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Table 1 Reduced game vr of
the game v in Example 4.1
S {1} {2} {3} {1, 2} {1, 3} {2, 3} {1, 2, 3}
vr (S) 0 0 0 1 1 0 2
Interestingly, the core of a permissible three-valued simple game equals the core of
the corresponding reduced game, when extended with zeros for all players outside the
set of vital players. For a permissible game v ∈ TSIN , the set of primary vital players
of v is defined by
PVit(v) =
⋂
{S ⊆ Vit(v) | vr (S) ∈ {1, 2}}
and the set of secondary vital pairs of v by
SVit(v) = {{i, j} ⊆ Vit(v)\PVit(v) | i = j, {i, j} ∩ S = ∅ for all S with vr (S) = 1}.
Hence, the primary vital players are the vital players who belong to every coalition
with value 1 or 2 in vr . Similarly, the secondary vital pairs are the pairs of non-primary
vital players such that for every coalition with value 1 in vr , at least one player of such
a pair belongs to the coalition. The vital core VC(v) of a permissible game v ∈ TSIN
is defined by
VC(v) = Conv({2e{i} | i ∈ PVit(v)}
∪{e{i, j} | i ∈ PVit(v), j ∈ Vit(v)\PVit(v)}
∪{e{i, j} | {i, j} ∈ SVit(v)}).
The following example illustrates the concepts introduced above.





2 if S ∈ {{1, 2, 3}, N },
1 if S ∈ {{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {1, 2, 4}, {1, 3, 4}},
0 otherwise.
Note that v is permissible since Vit(v) = {1, 2, 3} = ∅ and v(N\Vit(v)) = v({4}) =
0. The corresponding reduced three-valued simple game vr ∈ TSI{1,2,3} is given in
Table 1.
From the reduced game it follows that
PVit(v) = {1}
and
SVit(v) = {{2, 3}} .
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It can be shown that in this case we have VC(v) = C(v). 
For the game of Example 4.1 we have seen that the vital core equals the core. This
need not be true for general three-valued simple games (see Example 3.4 in Musegaas
et al. (2015)). In general, for a permissible game, the vital core is a subset of the core
as is seen in the following theorem.
Theorem 4.4 [cf. Musegaas et al. (2015)] Let v ∈ TSIN be permissible. Then,
VC(v) ⊆ C(v).
The following theorem provides a characterization of the vital core for three-valued
simple games induced by perfect conflict graphs.
Theorem 4.5 Let G = (N , E) be a perfect graph. If vG ∈ TSIN , then
VC(vG) = Conv
({
eN\S | S ∈ (G)
})
.
Proof Let vG ∈ TSIN . Then, using Theorem 4.1 and the fact that G is perfect, we
have ω(G) = χ(G) = n−2. In this proof we denote the intersection of all maximum
cliques in G by G , i.e.,
G =
⋂
{S | S ∈ (G)}.
We divide the proof into proving the following four statements:
(i) Vit(vG) = N\G ,
(ii) vG is permissible,
(iii) PVit(vG) = ∅,
(iv) SVit(vG) = {N\S | S ∈ (G)}.
Note that if the statements (i) - (iv) all hold, then it immediately follows from the
definition of the vital core that
VC(vG) = Conv
({
eN\S | S ∈ (G)
})
.
Part (i): [Vit(vG) = N\G ]
(“⊂”) Let i ∈ G , i.e., i belongs to every maximum clique of G. This implies that if
vertex i is removed, then the clique number decreases with one. Therefore,
vG(N\{i}) = n − 1 − χ(G[N\{i}]) = n − 1 − ω(G[N\{i}])
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= n − 1 − (ω(G) − 1) = n − 1 − (χ(G) − 1) = n − 1 − (n − 3) = 2,
where the second and the fourth equalities follow from the fact that G is perfect.
Hence, there exists an S ⊆ N\{i} such that vG(S) = 2, so i /∈ Vit(vG).
(“⊃”) Let i ∈ N\G , i.e., there exists a maximum clique of G to which i does not
belong. This implies that if vertex i is removed, then the clique number does not
change. Therefore,
vG(N\{i}) = n − 1 − χ(G[N\{i}]) = n − 1 − ω(G[N\{i}])
= n − 1 − ω(G) = n − 1 − χ(G) = n − 1 − (n − 2) = 1,
where the second and the fourth equalities follow from the fact that G is perfect.
Moreover, from monotonicity of vG it follows that vG(S) ≤ 1 for all S ⊆ N\{i}, so
there does not exist an S ⊆ N\{i} with vG(S) = 2. As a consequence, for all S ⊆ N
with vG(S) = 2 we have i ∈ S and thus i ∈ Vit(vG).
Part (ii): [vG is permissible]
Since ω(G) = n − 2, we know that N cannot be a maxium clique and thus G = N .
Hence,
Vit(vG) = N\G = ∅.
Moreover, since G is the intersection of all maximum cliques in G, we know that
G forms a clique as well and thus χ(G[G]) = |G |. As a consequence,
vG(N\Vit(vG)) = vG(G) = 0.
This implies that vG is permissible.
Part (iii): [PVit(vG) = ∅]
Since Vit(vG) = N\G , we know that for every vital player there exists a maximum
clique of G to which this player does not belong. As a consequence, for i ∈ Vit(vG),
we have
χ(G[N\{i}]) = ω(G[N\{i}]) = ω(G) = n − 2,
where the first equality follows from the fact that G is perfect and the second equality
follows from the fact that there exists a maximum clique of G to which i does not
belong. Therefore,
vGr (Vit(v
G)\{i}) = vG(Vit(vG)\{i} ∪ (N\Vit(vG))) = vG(N\{i})
= n − 1 − χ(G[N\{i}]) = n − 1 − (n − 2) = 1,
for all i ∈ Vit(vG). As a consequence,
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PVit(vG) =
⋂{




Vit(vG)\{i} | i ∈ Vit(vG)
}
= ∅.
Part (iv): [SVit(vG) = {N\S | S ∈ (G)}]
(“⊃”) Let S ∈ (G). Since ω(G) = n − 2, we can denote N\S = {i, j} with i = j .
Note {i, j} ∩ G = ∅ and thus {i, j} ⊆ Vit(vG). Moreover, since PVit(vG) = ∅,
we have {i, j} ⊆ Vit(vG)\PVit(vG). Suppose {i, j} /∈ SVit(vG), then it follows from
the definition of secondary vital pairs that there exists a T ⊆ Vit(vG)\{i, j} with
vGr (T ) = 1. Since T ⊆ Vit(vG)\{i, j}, we have
(T ∪ G) ⊆ ((Vit(vG)\{i, j}) ∪ G) = N\{i, j} = S.
Moreover, since S forms a maximum clique inG, we have χ(G[T ∪G ]) = |T ∪G |
and thus
vGr (T ) = vG(T ∪ (N\Vit(vG))) = vG(T ∪ G) = |T ∪ G | − χ(G[T ∪ G])
= |T ∪ G | − |T ∪ G | = 0,
which contradicts vGr (T ) = 1. Hence, {i, j} ∈ SVit(vG).
(“⊂”) Let {i, j} ∈ SVit(vG) and suppose N\{i, j} does not form a maximum clique
in G, i.e., ω(G[N\{i, j}]) < n − 2. Then,
vGr (Vit(v
G)\{i, j}) = vG((Vit(vG)\{i, j}) ∪ (N\Vit(vG))) = vG(N\{i, j})
= (n − 2) − χ(G[N\{i, j}]) = (n − 2) − ω(G[N\{i, j}])
> (n − 2) − (n − 2) = 0,
where the penultimate equality again follows from the fact that G is perfect. Conse-
quently, using the fact that a reduced game allows for only one coalition with value 2,
namely the grand coalition Vit(vG), we have vGr (Vit(v
G)\{i, j}) = 1 which contra-
dicts the assumption that {i, j} ∈ SVit(vG). 	unionsq
Example 4.2 Consider the perfect conflict graph G = (N , E) with N = {1, . . . , 6} as
depicted in Fig. 4. Since (G) = {{1, 3, 5, 6}, {1, 4, 5, 6}} and vG ∈ TSIN , it follows
from Theorem 4.5 that
VC(vG) = Conv ({(0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0)}) .

By combining Theorem 2.2 and Theorem 4.5 the general relation between the vital
core and the core can be strengthened for three-valued simple minimum coloring
games, i.e., for three-valued simple minimum coloring games induced by perfect
conflict graphs the core equals the vital core.
Corollary 4.6 Let G = (N , E) be a perfect graph. If vG ∈ TSIN , then
C(vG) = VC(vG).
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Fig. 4 The conflict graph of example 4.2
4.2 Three-valued simple minimum coloring games induced by imperfect
conflict graphs
In this section we consider three-valued simple minimum coloring games induced by
imperfect conflict graphs. First, we characterize this class of conflict graphs, after that
we show that the induced minimum coloring games always have an empty core.
Note that all imperfect graphs have at least five vertices, because it must contain an
odd cycle graph of length at least five, or a complement of such graph as an induced
subgraph (cf. Theorem2.3). The following theoremprovides a necessary and sufficient
condition for an imperfect conflict graph to induce a three-valued simple game. For
this theorem, we use the notion of a dominating vertex. A vertex i ∈ N is called
dominating in G if { j | j ∈ N , {i, j} ∈ E} = N\{i}, i.e., if i is adjacent to every other
vertex.
Theorem 4.7 Let G = (N , E) be an imperfect graph. Then, vG ∈ TSIN if and only if
there exists an S ⊆ N such that G[S] = C5 and all vertices outside S are dominating.
Proof (“⇐”) Let S ⊆ N be such that G[S] = C5 and let all vertices outside S be
dominating. Since all vertices in N\S are dominating, we have G[N\S] = K|N\S|
and thus χ(G[N\S]) = n − 5. Moreover, since each vertex in S is adjacent to each
vertex in N\S, we have
χ(G) = χ(G[N\S]) + χ(G[S]) = n − 5 + 3 = n − 2,
where the second equality follows fromLemma3.2. Consequently, usingTheorem4.1,
we have vG ∈ TSIN .
(“⇒”) Let vG ∈ TSIN . Since G is not perfect, we know from Theorem 2.3 that there
exists an S ⊆ N such that G[S] = C2k+1 or G[S] = C¯2k+1 with k ≥ 2. Suppose
k > 2. Then, using Lemma 3.2, we have
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vG(S) = |S| − χ(G[S]) = 2k + 1 − 3 = 2k − 2 > 2,
in case G[S] = C2k+1, or
vG(S) = |S| − χ(G[S]) = 2k + 1 − (k + 1) = k > 2,
in case G[S] = C¯2k+1, which both contradict vG being a three-valued simple game.
Hence, k = 2 and thus G[S] = C5 or G[S] = C¯5. Since C5 and C¯5 are isomorphic
to each other3. and thus both graphs have the same clique and chromatic number, we
can conclude that G[S] = C5.
Now, suppose χ(G[N\S]) < |N\S| = n − 5. Then
vG(N ) = n − χ(G) ≥ n − (χ(G[S]) + χ(G[N\S])) > n − (3 + n − 5) = 2,
which contradicts vG being a three-valued simple game. Hence, we may assume
χ(G[N\S]) = n − 5 and thus G[N\S] = K|N\S|. As a consequence, all players in
N\S are mutually adjacent, i.e.,
{ j | j ∈ N\S, {i, j} ∈ E} = (N\S)\{i},
for all i ∈ N\S.
Next, suppose {i, j} /∈ E for some i ∈ S and j ∈ N\S. Then, since there exists a
vertex in S that is not adjacent to a vertex in N\S, those two players can receive the
same color in the minimum coloring of G. Hence, χ(G) < χ(G[S]) + χ(G[N\S])
and thus
vG(N ) = n − χ(G) > n − (χ(G[S]) + χ(G[N\S])) = n − (3 + n − 5) = 2,
which again contradicts vG being a three-valued simple game. Hence, we may assume
that every player in N\S is adjacent to all players in S, i.e.,
{ j | j ∈ S, {i, j} ∈ E} = S,
3 To see that C5 and C¯5 are isomorphic to each other, consider the graphs G = (N , E) and G′ = (N ′, E ′)
with N = N ′ = {1, . . . , 5},
E = {{1, 2}, {1, 5}, {2, 3}, {3, 4}, {4, 5}},
and
E ′ = {{1, 3}, {1, 4}, {2, 4}, {2, 5}, {3, 5}.
If one takes the bijection f : N → N ′ with f (1) = 1, f (2) = 3, f (3) = 5, f (4) = 2 and f (5) = 4, then
{u, v} ∈ E if and only if { f (u), f (v)} ∈ E ′
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Fig. 5 All imperfect conflict graphs (up to isomorphism) on five, six or seven vertices inducing a three-
valued simple game
for all i ∈ N\S. Consequently,
{ j | j ∈ N , {i, j} ∈ E} = N\{i},
for all i ∈ N\S, i.e., all vertices outside S are dominating. 	unionsq
The previous theorem implies that, for given n ≥ 5, the class of imperfect conflict
graphs on n vertices inducing a three-valued simple game consists of a unique conflict
graph (up to isomorphism), namely the conflict graph that contains C5 as an induced
subgraph and all other vertices being dominated. Fig. 5 depicts all imperfect conflict
graphs (up to isomorphism) on five, six and seven vertices inducing a three-valued
simple game. For all these conflict graphs, the subgraph induced by {1, 2, . . . , 5} is
the cycle graph C5 and all other vertices are dominating.
Using Theorem 4.7, the clique number and the number of maxiumum cliques for
imperfect conflict graphs inducing three-valued simple games immediately follows,
as is stated in the following corollary.
Corollary 4.8 Let G = (N , E) be an imperfect graph. If vG ∈ TSIN , then ω(G) =
n − 3 and |(G)| = 5.
For three-valued simple minimum coloring games induced by imperfect conflict
graphs, the core is empty as is seen in the following theorem.
Theorem 4.9 Let G = (N , E) be an imperfect graph. If vG ∈ TSIN , then vG is not
permissible and thus C(vG) = ∅.
Proof Let vG ∈ TSIN . Then, Theorem 4.7 implies that there exists an S ⊆ N such
that G[S] = C5. For i ∈ S, we have




{S ⊆ N | vG(S) = 2} ⊆
⋂
{S\{i} | i ∈ S} = ∅,
so vG is not permissible. Since only three-valued simple games that are permissible
can have a non-empty core (see Lemma 4.3), we have C(vG) = ∅. 	unionsq
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